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Germany has embarked on an ambitious project to transform its energy system until 2050 – 
the so-called Energiewende. Some critics contend that the Energiewende imposes unneces-
sary and avoidable welfare losses due to a lack of integration within the EU. In contrast, 
these critiques largely miss the point because the asserted lack of integration cannot be 
pinned on the Energiewende and the welfare consequences of EU-wide integration are less 
clear than the critiques imply. 
Germany aims to completely redesign its energy system within the next decades. In particular, 
nuclear power shall be phased out by 2022 and the share of renewable energy sources (RES) 
in overall electricity supply shall be increased to at least 80 percent by 2050. While many in-
ternational observers regard this ambitious set of energy transition targets with a mix of ap-
plauding respect and slight skepticism1, some domestic critics judge very harshly about the 
transformation project. Specifically, they criticize that the Energiewende is a national and 
unilateral approach that fails to reap potential benefits of an EU-wide approach.2 It has even 
been suggested that Germany, by rolling out Energiewende polices, acts as a kind of wrong-
way driver heading in the opposite direction of a presumed mainstream of European energy 
policy3  In consequence, the critics contend that Germany should only proceed with its energy 
transition policies (if at all4) in case they are aligned within a common EU-framework. 
The critics bring forward two main economic arguments: First, the spatial allocation of elec-
tricity infrastructure (generation facilities and transmission lines) could be more efficiently 
organized on the EU level.5 Second, the technology portfolio that emerges from Germany’s 
1 E. g, D. Buchan: The Energiewende: Germany’s Gamble. The Oxford Institute for Energy Studies: Working 
Papers, 2012, http://www.oxfordenergy.org/wpcms/wpcontent/uploads/2012/07/SP-26.pdf 
2 E. g., acatech (Hrsg.): Die Energiewende finanzierbar gestalten. Effiziente Ordnungspolitik für das Energiesys-
tem der Zukunft. Acatech Position, 2012, Heidelberg; J. Weimann: Atomausstieg und Energiewende: Wie 
sinnvoll ist der deutsche Alleingang? Energiewirtschaftliche Tagesfragen, 2012, 62 (12): 34-38. 
3 H.-W. Sinn: Zu viele unrealistische Hoffnungen und zu wenig Pragmatismus, Energiewirtschaftliche 
Tagesfragen 2012, 62 (1/2): 54-56. 
4 J. Weimann: Rettet die Energiewende? Warum eigentlich? Wirtschaftsdienst 2013 (11): 793-795. 
5 M. Frondel, C. Schmidt and N. aus dem Moore: Marktwirtschaftliche Energiewende: Ein Wettbewerbsrahmen 
für die Stromversorgung mit alternativen Technologien. Zeitschrift für Energiewirtschaft, 2013 37 (??): 27-41; 
A. Mundt: Die Energiewende braucht Marktvertrauen. Zeitschrift für das gesamte Recht der Energiewirtschaft, 
2013, 2 (6), 241-242. 
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feed-in tariff for RES is said to be inefficient compared to an EU-wide scheme of tradeable 
green electricity quotas.6 In the following, the validity of these arguments is questioned. We 
argue that – while technically correct – they only hold under very narrow assumptions, which 
all but nullifies their warranted assertion.  
Therefore, the perspective should be broadened so as to provide a more comprehensive pic-
ture. In particular, the following aspects are indispensable for an overall assessment of Ger-
many’s energy transition policies within the EU-context: 
− Can Germany’s Energiewende be meaningfully described as unilateral? First and fore-
most, it is an empirical question whether Germany’s energy policy stands out compared to 
its neighbors. In fact, the analysis shows that the claim of unilateralism cannot be substan-
tiated because the main pillars of the Energiewende, the nuclear phase-out and RES sup-
port policies (objectives as well as instruments), are not unique within the EU; the same 
also goes for Germany’s RES shares and mid-term renewables goals up to 2020 that are 
completely in line with the EU average (Table 2). Furthermore, since energy policies are, 
on the whole, rather diverse in the EU, any perceived lack of integration cannot be blamed 
on one particular Member State. 
 
− How strong is the economic case for EU-wide integration of energy transition policies? 
This normative question is not reducible to the issue of geographical production costs of 
RES: instead, a range of arguments concerning general issues (e.g., decentral vs. uniform 
provision of public goods) and specific aspects of the energy transition are to be consid-
ered here. For instance, a complete evaluation needs to take possible preference heteroge-
neity concerning externalities from electricity production (e.g. nuclear risks, landscape 
impacts of renewable energy plants) into account.  
 
− Specific questions on the appropriateness of particular policy instruments must not be 
conflated with the analysis of the adequate governance level for energy transition policies. 
For instance, the issue whether a feed-in tariff or a quota system is preferable for support-
ing RES needs to be separated from the question whether RES-policies should be imple-
mented on the EU-level or on the level of Member States. 
 
− Assuming that closer cooperation on some aspects of Energiewende policies is to be wel-
comed, which pathways are most conducive towards integration, given specific legal and 
politico-economic side constraints? Against the background of past developments in EU 
energy policy, it is clear that bottom-up processes are far more likely to facilitate coopera-
tion than centralization and forced top-down harmonization of policies. 
Thus, the abovementioned critiques of the energy transition are, at the end of the day, hardly 
ever convincing and should not guide policy advice: an EU-wide scheme of tradable green 
6 M. Hübner, C. Schmidt and B. Weigert: Energiepolitik: Erfolgreiche Energiewende nur im europäischen 
Kontext. Perspektiven der Wirtschaftspolitik, 2012, 13(4): 286-307; J. Haucap and J. Kühling 2013: Zeit für eine 
grundlegende Reform der EEG-Förderung – das Quotenmodell. Energiewirtschaftliche Tagesfragen, 2012, 63 
(3): 41-49. 
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electricity quotas neither is a readily available policy option, nor should it constitute the goal 
of German energy transition polices. The rest of this paper demonstrates that neither implica-
tion is valid by setting out the above points in more detail. 
Nuclear power and RES policies in the EU 
To which extent can the main pillars of the electricity-related Energiewende, the nuclear-
phase out and the specific RES support policies, be considered as outliers in the EU? 
First, as regards nuclear power, a rather diverse picture emerges: Table 1 displays the number 
of nuclear reactors, which are currently in operation, under construction or in planning within 
the EU-28 Member States and Switzerland. Several observations seem noteworthy. To start 
with, there is a huge spread between the countries that do rely on nuclear power: on the one 
hand, the nuclear share of overall electricity production in France reaches almost ¾; on the 
other hand, the nuclear share in the Netherlands stands at slightly below three percent. In ad-
dition, a number of EU-Member States do not rely on nuclear energy, among them Italy, Aus-
tria, Portugal and Ireland. An exception is Poland, which currently does not have nuclear 
plants but envisages building two plants in the future. Furthermore, two European countries, 
Switzerland and Belgium, also have recently decided to phase out nuclear power. Summing 
up, portraying Germany’s nuclear phase-out as an outlier somewhat distorts the actual status-
quo of nuclear power in Europe. As there is no discernable trend or mainstream to which all 
nuclear policies could be said to converge, singling out Germany’s phase-out as unilateral 
seems unjustified.  
Second, regarding the targets for RES expansion by 2020, Germany might even be considered 
as below-average, as Table 2 shows. In fact, both Germany’s share of RES at final energy 
consumption in 2012 and the corresponding target for 2020 are slightly below the average on 
EU-level. Thus, any claim about exceptionality of Germany’s RES policies must refer to the 
2050 horizon, where Germany’s RES targets are indeed ambitious and other Member States 
lack comparative long-term frameworks. In a sense, the ambition of Germany’s energy transi-
tion lies not so much in the mid-term targets for RES, but rather in the fact that a thoroughly 
industrialized country, which often praises itself for being “World Champion” in exporting 
goods, aims at completely transforming its energy system in the long run. However, other 
European countries will be forced to set appropriate energy policy goals for 2050 in line with 
the overall EU decarbonisation scheme for the energy sector. Comparing German 2050 goals 
with present-day EU-wide energy policies does not make much sense. 
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Table 1: Nuclear power in Europe (EU-28 plus Switzerland) 
Source: Adapted from European Nuclear Society7 and Eurostat8  
 
Country 
No. of 
reactors 
in opera-
tion 
Nuclear share 
at overall 
electricity 
supply 
Future development 
Countries that 
rely on nuclear 
power or intend 
to phase in 
Netherlands 1 2.9% - 
Slovenia 1 33.4% - 
Bulgaria 2 33.2% - 
Romania 2 21.2% - 
Finland 4 33.3% 1 reactor in construction 
Hungary 4 51.5% - 
Slovakia 4 54.7% 2 reactors in construction 
Czech Repub-
lic 6 35.9% - 
Spain 7 19.7% - 
Sweden 10 42.6% - 
UK 16 18.8% 1 reactor in planning 
France 58 73.6% 1 reactor in construction 
Poland - - 2 reactors in planning- 
Countries that 
have no nuclear 
power or intend 
to phase out 
Austria - - - 
Croatia - - - 
Cyprus - - - 
Denmark - - - 
Estonia - - - 
Greece - - - 
Ireland - - - 
Italy - - - 
Latvia - - - 
Lithuania - - - 
Luxembourg - - - 
Malta - - - 
Portugal - - - 
Switzerland 5 36.4% Nuclear phase-out by 2034 
Belgium 7 52.1% Nuclear phase-out by 2025 
Germany 9 15.4% Nuclear phase-out by 2022 
  
7 http://www.euronuclear.org/1-information/maps.htm  (Data for 2014) 
8http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/statistics_explained/index.php/Electricity_production_and_supply_statistics#So
urce_data_for_tables.2C_figures_and_maps_on_this_page_.28MS_Excel.29 (Data for 2013) 
                                                            
 
 
5 Strunz / Gawel / Lehmann: On the alleged need to strictly „Europeanize“ the German Energiewende 
Table 2: Share of RES at final energy consumption 
and EU targets for 20209 
 RES share 2012 RES target 2020 
EU-27 14.1 % 20.0 % 
BE 6.8 % 13.0 % 
BG 16.3 % 16.0 % 
CZ 11.2 % 13.0 % 
DK 26 % 30.0 % 
DE 12.4 % 18.0 % 
EE 25.9 % 25.0 % 
IE 7.2 % 16.0 % 
EL 11.6 % 18.0 % 
ES 14.3 % 20.0 % 
FR 13.4 % 23.0 % 
IT 13.5 % 17.0 % 
CY 6.8 % 13.0 % 
LV 35.8 % 40.0 % 
LT 21.7 % 23.0 % 
LU 3.1 % 11.0 % 
HU 9.6 % 13.0 % 
MT 1.4 % 10.0 % 
NL 4.5 % 14.0 % 
AT 32.1 % 34.0 % 
PL 11 % 15.0 % 
PT 24.6 % 31.0 % 
RO 22.9 % 24.0 % 
SI 20.2 % 25.0 % 
SK 10.4 % 14.0 % 
FI 34.3 % 38.0 % 
SE 51 % 49.0 % 
UK 4.2 % 15.0 % 
  
9 http://de.statista.com/statistik/daten/studie/29592/umfrage/anteil-der-energieerzeugung-durch-erneuerbare-
energie-in-der-eu-27-in-2005/ 
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Furthermore, Germany’s support scheme for RES is no misfit within the EU. The Renewable 
Energy Sources Act (“EEG”), which prioritizes RES as regards electricity feed-in into the 
system and guarantees a fixed remuneration for every kWh of RES-electricity produced, had 
been introduced in 2000. At the time, only six other EU-Member States has implemented sim-
ilar RES support policies. However, as can be seen from Table 3, by 2010 this form of sup-
port via feed-in tariff had become the mainstream way of pushing RES in the EU. Interesting-
ly, also the recent revisions of the EEG are perfectly aligned with the general development of 
support policies: In 2012, Germany introduced a premium scheme in order to steer dispatcha-
ble RES. Questions about the economic merit of this measure notwithstanding,10 it directly 
corresponds to the continuous EU-wide trend of complementing feed-in schemes by premium 
schemes. The most recent revision of the EEG in 2014 envisages (skeptically: ponders – de-
pending on the reading of the rather vague formulations within the law) a long-term transfor-
mation away from feed-in tariffs and towards tender schemes. Again, this conforms to the 
overall direction, if the EU Commission’s guidelines may serve as point of reference.11  
Table 3: Number of Member States that have implemented  
specific RES-instruments 
Source: adapted from Kitzing et al. (2012: 196; see fn 12) and www.res-legal.eu 
 
 2000 2005 2010 2013 
Feed-in tariff 7 16 23 17 
Feed-in premi-
um 
- 4 7 10 
Quota 1 6 6 6 
Tender 2 2 6 2 
On the basis of these general trends, and more detailed analyses of parallel developments in 
some EU countries, some have even argued that there is evidence of bottom-up convergence 
of RES policies.12 In any case, what the analysis clearly demonstrates is that Germany’s RES 
support policies are far from being an outlier or a wrong-way driver in the EU; to the contra-
ry, in comparison to the quota scheme, Germany’s introduction of a feed-in tariff (and revi-
sions thereof) can reasonably even be considered as mainstream policies. 
10 Cf. E. Gawel and A. Purkus: Promoting market and system integration of renewable energies through premi-
um schemes – A case study of the German market premium, 2012, Energy Policy 61: 599-609. 
11 Cf. E. Gawel and S. Strunz: State Aid Dispute on Germany’s Support for Renewables: Is the Commission on 
the Right Course? 2014, Journal for European Environmental and Planning Law 11 (2): 139-152. 
12 D. Jacobs: Renewable Energy Policy Convergence in the EU: The Evolution of Feed-in Tariffs in Germany, 
Spain and France, 2012, London: Ashgate; L. Kitzing, C. Mitchell and P. Mothorst:  Renewable energy policies 
in Europe: converging or diverging? Energy Policy, 2012, 51: 192-201. 
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EU-wide integration of energy transition polices? 
In order to address the question how “Europeanized” Germany’s energy transition policies 
should be, it is necessary to clarify analytically what “Europeanization” actually means.13 On 
the one hand, Europeanization might refer to the degree of homogeneity of policies across the 
EU. On the other hand, Europeanization might refer to the location of decision making power 
on a continuum from completely decentralized on the level of Member States to fully central-
ized on the EU-level. Based on this differentiation, then, specific criteria for more integration 
on each of the dimensions could be set up. For the scope of this contribution, however, it suf-
fices to point out that there are two aspects to Europeanization and that these need not neces-
sarily align: for example, a more homogeneous pattern of policies might be achieved by cen-
tralized decision-making at the EU level as well as via decentralized cooperation between 
Member States.  
In general, a tension exists between the EU’s aim of a common internal market for energy and 
the Member States sovereignty over energy policy. This tension materializes both legally and 
economically. Legally, the Treaty for the European Union (TFEU) is sufficiently vague in 
providing both supranational EU-institutions and the Member States with competing and 
overlapping competences (see also below). Economically, the welfare benefits from an inter-
nal market need to be traded off with possible welfare losses from overriding national peculi-
arities – the case of the Energiewende is a prime example in this respect, as will be argued in 
the following. 
To what extent, then, would an EU-version of the Energiewende be desirable? As regards the 
nuclear phase-out, the obvious heterogeneity of policies in the EU challenges the notion that 
there might be welfare gains from harmonizing policies: The diversity of nuclear policies 
points to an underlying diversity of preferences about the risks associated with nuclear power. 
In particular, (hypothetically) imposing a nuclear phase-out on France would imply overriding 
French risk preferences. Certainly, also the systemic costs of a rapid French nuclear phase-out 
related to the much higher dependence on nuclear power compared to Germany would be 
huge. Certainly, some supranational coordination may be warranted as some nuclear risks 
may be transboundary. However, such issues do not necessarily call for a uniform EU-wide 
approach but may also be addressed by bilateral agreements.  
Turning to the deployment of RES: assume, for the sake of argument, that there was a clean 
sweep and Europe’s energy supply could be rebuilt from scratch. In order to minimize pro-
duction costs, RES should be allocated according to most favourable geographical conditions, 
placing photovoltaic installations in Southern Europe and so on. Additionally, a European-
wide supergrid could be implemented, possibly including North African deserts as large-scale 
13 For an extended discussion of the arguments presented in this subsection see E. Gawel, S. Strunz and P. Leh-
mann: Wieviel Europa braucht die Energiewende? UFZ-Discussion Papers, 2014, Working Paper No. 2014-4 
and S. Strunz, E. Gawel and P. Lehmann: Towards a general “Europeanization” of EU Member States’ energy 
policies? UFZ-Discussion Papers, 2014, Working Paper No. 2014-17 
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production location and Norway’s fjords as storage facilities14. Such seems to be the hidden 
vision behind some of the Energiewende critiques. 
Yet, this counterfactual scenario is no appropriate yardstick for assessing current RES poli-
cies. Sure enough, there are sizable benefits from coordinating RES-support schemes to be 
expected.15 However, this does not necessarily imply that a completely harmonized approach 
should be aimed for. Firstly, RES-related preference heterogeneity has to be taken into ac-
count: negative external effects of RES are highly technology-specific but mostly local (com-
pare wind and biomass), so potential benefits from economies of scale in centralizing RES at 
geographical hotspots have to be traded-off with according negative externalities in the form 
of acceptance problems. EU-wide optimization of production facilities would also lead to in-
creased need for transmission line extensions – current protests in Germany against new 
transmission lines attest to the related difficulties. Additionally, the idea of transforming 
Norway into a “green battery” for Europe should not be taken as a politically available short-
term option due to ambivalent Norwegian preferences (landscape conservation vs. economic 
benefits from storing electricity) and the prevalent political culture of incremental change.16 
For the same preference-related reason, it is not clear whether the use of Norwegian fjords as 
“green batteries” would really improve the overall efficiency including environmental and 
resource costs of land-use change. Thus, spatially allocating RES is not reducible to a one-
dimensional optimization problem following geographical patterns of energy yields and direct 
generation costs. Secondly, beyond these RES-specific aspects, there is a more general issue 
that deserves consideration: decentralized regulatory “experiments” may improve the overall 
result of policy intervention (aka the laboratory federalism argument). In case of uncertainty 
about the best regulatory solution to address a given problem, trial-and-error on lower gov-
ernment scales supposedly yields faster feedback-processes and policy adaptation and reduces 
societal learning costs compared to a uniform top-down EU approach. 
In sum, a thorough and rapid “Europeanization” of German energy transition policies is un-
likely to constitute the adequate policy recommendation from a comprehensive economic 
point of view. Instead, while more coordinated RES-support seems worthwhile for increasing 
production cost efficiency, a fully harmonized EU support scheme is not to be called for. In 
case of nuclear power, broad policy diversity in the EU means that a fully harmonized ap-
proach would override diversity of risk preferences. 
RES-support: distinguishing “on what level?” and  
“by which instrument?”  
The above-mentioned argument that Germany’s RES-support scheme leads to an inefficient 
technology portfolio unduly mixes two levels of analysis: a given preference for regulating 
RES-policy on a specific governance level does not entail a distinct preference for a specific 
14 Cf. C. Macilwain: Supergrid: Is a vast undersea grid bringing wind-generated electricity from the North Sea to 
Europe a feasible proposition or an overpriced fantasy? Nature, 2012, 468: 624-625.  
15 M. Unteutsch and D. Lindenberger: Promotion of Electricity from Renewable Energy in Europe Post 2020 – 
The Economic Benefits of Cooperation. Zeitschrift für Energiewirtschaft, 2014, 38 (1): 47-64. 
16 A.-T. Gullberg: The political feasibility of Norway as the “green battery” of Europe. Energy Policy, 2012, 57: 
615-623. 
                                                            
 
 
9 Strunz / Gawel / Lehmann: On the alleged need to strictly „Europeanize“ the German Energiewende 
instrument. While the proponents of the argument suggest (partly implicitly, partly explicitly) 
that a trading scheme for green electricity certificates – analogous to the emissions trading 
scheme – is the most appropriate for an EU-wide approach towards RES, such a general 
proposition is not warranted. In the following, we outline some criteria by which to evaluate 
the question of how to support RES. 
Assuming, for the sake of argument, that a harmonized RES-support scheme is desirable – 
how to decide upon the best instrument to reach a common EU-target for RES? Naturally, 
each instrument exhibits specific (dis-)advantages. Focusing on feed-in tariffs and quota 
schemes allows us to see the according pros and cons in more detail. Since Weitzman’s semi-
nal 1974 study17 it is common wisdom in economics that the relative slopes of marginal costs 
and marginal benefits are crucial when deciding between a price (feed-in tariff) and a quantity 
(quota) instrument.18  
Thus, the question becomes one of determining and evaluating costs and benefits from de-
ploying RES. It has been argued that a stronger focus on the cross-boundary benefits of RES 
would speak in favor of feed-in tariffs: in particular, benefits of increased security of supply 
(due to lower fossil fuel imports from potentially unstable world regions) might be rather con-
stant over the whole range of RES-deployment, which would speak in favor of a price instru-
ment.19 In contrast, if local employment impacts are of main concern to policy makers, bene-
fits from RES may mainly accrue in the early stages of deployment, suggesting preferability 
of a quota scheme. The latter point, however, is somewhat self-defeating: in case local bene-
fits are a main driver of RES-support, political willingness to coordinate across boundaries 
will usually not be given in the first place (see also below). Likewise, common arguments in 
favor of quantity instruments, cost efficiency and precise regulation of progressive damage 
functions, seem to cancel each other out in the case of RES: consider wind energy, which, as 
cheapest volatile RES, would mostly benefit from a quota scheme. However, the negative 
externalities (i.e., the aesthetic impact on landscape scenery and the ecological impact on bird 
populations) are increasing per windmill built. So in order to limit these progressive damages, 
regulators might want to set technology-specific quotas.20 Then again, this technology-
differentiation would reduce the benefits of a quota scheme in terms of cost savings from sup-
porting only the cheapest technologies. 
Apart from these issues, there is another, energy system-related objection to be made against 
the “inefficient technology portfolio” charge that is meant to prove the superiority of the quo-
ta scheme: the argument is based on a static conception of efficiency, which is somewhat at 
odds with the long-term project of the Energiewende and general characteristics of the energy 
system (path-dependency, lock-in effects) suggesting we should rely on a dynamic perspec-
tive. Under simple quota systems, private actors may fail to take optimal long-term invest-
17 M. L. Weitzman: Prices vs. quantities. 1974, Review of Economic Studies 41: 447-491. 
18 Without uncertainty about marginal costs and benefits, both approaches are theoretically equal because the 
regulator can either set a quantity target or implement an equivalent price instrument. 
19 P. Söderholm: Harmonization of renewable feed-in laws: A comment, 2008, Energy Policy 36: 946-953 
20 Ensuring grid stability by putting a portfolio of complementary RES in place is another reason why technolo-
gy-specific quotas would be preferable (e. g., a combination of wind and solar is more robust to meteorological 
fluctuations than each of the technologies by itself). 
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ment decisions for a variety of reasons, including externalities (knowledge spillovers), myopic 
decision-making or improper consideration of uncertainty. In the presence of these market 
failures, feed-in tariffs might be preferable in addressing the long-term market prospects of 
specific RES – particularly those that are in rather early development stages and, therefore, 
would not benefit from a pure quota scheme. For instance, the feed-in tariff-driven, large-
scale deployment of photovoltaic installations in Germany during the last decade contributed 
to driving down module costs.21  
Summing up, there is no theoretical reason a priori to prefer a specific instrument to support 
RES. Considering the actual distribution of instruments in the EU (as outlined above), how-
ever, it might be argued that since feed-in tariffs (or feed-in premiums) are more common 
than quota schemes, the former could more easily be merged into a joint, supranational sup-
port scheme. In the following, we describe the conditions for more coordinated RES-policies.  
Fostering the EU-embedment of RES policies:  
bottom-up instead of top-down 
The historical development of RES policies in the EU has shown, above all, that Member 
States consistently resist the Commission’s attempts to implement an EU-wide quota scheme: 
the origins of both the directive 2001/77/EC and the substituting directive 2009/28/EC have 
been interpreted as failed attempts to do so.22 Recently, the Commission seems avid to push 
Member States into the direction of uniform tender schemes.23 Given the history of Member 
States’ refusal to adopt top-down harmonization and their insistence on national sovereignty 
over the energy mix in the Lisbon Treaty – article 194(2) TFEU affirms “a Member State’s 
right to determine the conditions for exploiting its energy resources, its choice between differ-
ent energy sources and the general structure of its energy supply” – the prospects for the suc-
cess of this plan could be meager. 
Furthermore, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) has upheld Member States’ rights to pursue 
purely national RES-policies: in its decision concerning Finish Åland Vindkraft’s complaint 
to access the Swedish RES-support scheme, the ECJ stated that although national support 
schemes might be distorting the internal market, they can be justified as policy interventions 
aiming at the common interest (environmental protection, combating climate change).24 
Hence, both from a political and a legal point of view, the future of RES-policies in the EU is 
likely to be decided bottom-up rather than top-down. 
Clearly, the politico-economic interests giving rise to this constellation should be acknowl-
edged within policy recommendations. In other words, as Member States’ politicians are mo-
tivated by protecting regional and national energy infrastructures (so as to secure voter sup-
21 H. Wirth: Recent Facts about Photovoltaics in Germany, 2014: 8 ff, 
http://www.ise.fraunhofer.de/en/publications/veroeffentlichungen-pdf-dateien-en/studien-und-
konzeptpapiere/recent-facts-about-photovoltaics-in-germany.pdf 
22 See Jacobs 2012 (fn. 12): 28 ff. 
23 EU Commission: Communication from the Commission. Guidelines on State aid for environmental protection 
and energy 2014-2020. Official Journal of the European Union (2014/C 200/01). 
24 Cf. E. Gawel and S. Strunz (see fn. 11). 
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port), policy advice that ignores actual political decision processes renders itself irrelevant. A 
completely technology-neutral RES-support scheme without reference to national peculiari-
ties would imply structural reallocations that are not politically palatable: if, for instance, sup-
port for photovoltaic installations in Germany were to cease – in favor of more convenient 
locations from a meteorological point of view –, considerable political protests from benefi-
ciaries and lobby groups would have to be overcome. 
Given these restrictions, what is the most realistic pathway towards more cooperative RES 
policies that take cross-boundary benefits into account? Interestingly, the relevant legal provi-
sion, the directive 2009/28/EC, already provides for cooperation between Member States (sta-
tistical transfers, joint projects, joint support schemes). So far, these cooperation mechanisms 
have not been used, however. On the one hand, from a pessimistic outlook, one could argue 
that if not even these existing options are realized, RES policies are likely to remain an exclu-
sively national issue for the time being. The apparent failure of Member States to agree on an 
extension of binding RES-targets for the post-2020 period25 might be raised as support for 
this perspective. On the other hand, the hypothesis of bottom-up convergence implies that 
explicit cooperation between Member States is not necessarily the crucial mechanism at work. 
Instead, some of the benefits of allocating RES on above-Member-State-level could be indi-
rectly secured – by different national policies aligning (e.g. via spill-over of best-practice reg-
ulations) providing a more levelled playing field for RES across the EU. Additionally, the 
other instruments such as the EU emissions trading scheme and increased cooperation regard-
ing transnational transmission grids would also contribute to integration on RES. 
Conclusion 
Criticizing Germany’s Energiewende as a unilateral approach that inhibits an EU-wide opti-
mization of energy transition policies is misleading. To begin with, the two main pillars of the 
energy transition project, the nuclear phase-out and the deployment of RES, are less excep-
tional than sometimes suggested. Nuclear policies in the EU are highly diverse and Germa-
ny’s support scheme for RES is very similar to the other Member States’ schemes. Regarding 
the 2020 horizon, Germany’s RES targets might even be considered as below-average; as for 
the 2050 horizon, Germany’s RES targets are surely very ambitious. On the other hand, as 
Germany stands alone with respect to these long-term targets, a comparison with comparative 
policies is not yet possible. 
Moreover, in case of nuclear power, an EU-wide approach would probably not be – due to 
preference heterogeneity – desirable in the first place. As the nuclear phase out can and 
should not be imposed on neighboring countries that use nuclear power (France, Czech Re-
public), a national approach including bilateral negotiations on near-border power plants (e.g., 
Fessenheim in France, Temelin in the Czech republic) seems more appropriate. Sure enough, 
phasing-out nuclear power in Germany must be complemented by an according increase in 
RES deployment so as to avoid substituting domestic with imported nuclear power. Regard-
ing support policies for RES, increased cooperation would increase the cost efficiency of RES 
25 The proposition for the EU‘s Climate and Energy Policy towards 2030 does contain a common EU-wide target 
for RES. Without identifying clear responsibilities for specific Member States, however, the EU-target can hard-
ly be considered as legally binding. 
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deployment in the EU. Yet, concerning the externalities of specific RES, there might be pref-
erence heterogeneity as well and the argument for laboratory federalism should caution us 
against unambiguous calls for a completely harmonized EU-wide approach.  
Furthermore, the suggestion that a German switch to a green electricity quota scheme would 
mark the beginning of policy harmonization26 flies in the face of the actual developments in 
EU energy policy during the last two decades. The quota scheme has never represented the 
mainstream way of supporting RES in the EU. In contrast, feed-in tariffs and feed-in premi-
ums, such as implemented in Germany, proved to be most common. 
So, considering the European embedment of the Energiewende from a more comprehensive 
perspective, yields the following conclusions: A full and immediate “Europeanization” of the 
Energiewende could not be recommended. Yet albeit such proposals seem too visionary in the 
first place, there might still be a path towards improved cost efficiency of RES deployment, 
which is both sensible and feasible: bottom-up alignment of support policies for RES poses no 
legal obstacles and incurs the least political hurdles. 
26 Hübner et al. 2012 (fn. 6): 303. 
                                                            
